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If he were composing
today, Vivaldi would write a fifth season, The New TV season. More abundant
than Summer, brisker than Fall, more turbulent than Winter. A season punctuated
by that two-week crescendo called the Upfront. Last Spring, close to $9 billion
prime time dollars committed in weeks, at prices 8-to-15% higher, in a recession.
With the next upfront a few months away, it’s well to ask how did this
monster come to be and how has it survived its useful life? A Spring upfront
made sense when there was a new TV season each Fall, but not now when new shows
are dribbled-in across the year.
Far from a Perfect Market
The mechanics of the upfront market are simple. Advertisers can buy
TV in advance, upfront, or hold back money to buy TV later, as scatter. The
buyer plays the market by betting on demand. If the buyer commits upfront and
the market has overestimated demand, prices will fall in the scatter market
and the buyer will "lose money."
But the upfront is far from what Alan Greenspan would call a "perfect
market." There is disinformation, mind-games and the fix. The large sellers
have better market intelligence, more control and have stacked the deck. Fear
of not being able to deliver what the advertiser wants is what drives the buyer
to pay the higher price rather than risk the personal failure.
The Upfront is as old as Television
For all of its recent
celebrity, buying upfront isn’t new. In the early days of television everything
was sold upfront. Sponsorship discussions started the week after Washington's
Birthday and by the end of February, advertisers had committed to programs and
time periods for the following season.
Although it was all upfront, it was different. Negotiations were low-key and
discreet, more like private banking than a sheriff's auction. For the upfront
to become the major selling event, three pieces had to fall in place: the networks
had to control their programming. They had to invent the New Television Season
and advertisers had to move from sponsorship to package buying.
From sponsor to network control
In the 1950’s, advertisers not networks owned the top-rated shows like
Texaco Star Theater, Philco TV Playhouse, Colgate Comedy hour. To create a TV
market, the networks needed these big shows to package with the little ones.
Then in the late 1950's, a scandal of epic opportunity occurred. Twenty-one,
the popular advertiser-controlled quiz show turned out to be rigged. The congressional
investigation that followed gave the networks the political cover to take-over
programming from advertisers. And they did.
The New TV Season
Back then there was
no television season, either. The start-date of each program's cycle determined
when its new season began. I Love Lucy premiered in October, Dragnet in January.
Then in 1962, ABC, the weakest network, came up with the idea of premiering
all of its programs in a single week following Labor Day. CBS and NBC knew a
good thing and by the mid-sixties, the New TV season was a major national event,
marking the end of Summer as surely as back-to-school.
The Fall debut of new season programs helped to create the upfront by requiring
advertiser commitments by the Spring.
The 1960's also forced advertisers to rethink sponsorship. Costs rose rapidly
when live TV moved to film and the production values of Hollywood. Program risks
became greater as ABC gave viewers the choice of a third network. This meant
more shows would fail. The combination of higher cost and higher risk started
the advertiser migration from sponsorship to today's package buying, which is
the coin of the upfront market.
JWT took a stand and lost
By the 1970’s, the upfront was firmly in place and the ever-confident
networks were testing it with steep price increases. When CPM's went up an incredible
25 percent in 1975-76, J. Walter Thompson, the largest TV agency, decided to
sit it out and wait for more sensible pricing. But the timing was bad and Thompson
clients eventually paid more for poorer programs in the scatter market.
That experience scarred buyers and for the next 15 years, the preferred strategy
for buying network was to buy it early.
The emergence of “Clout”
By then agencies had learned they were powerless to moderate price increases.
So instead, they began to talk about beating the market by paying less than
the average increase. The tools were "clout" and "corporate buying".
Clout stressed the need for big dollars to get good prices. That made agencies
in-house advocates for television. This increased the demand for TV time and
helped support the higher prices clients were trying to avoid.
Despite the rhetoric of negotiation, a supportive relationship developed between
buyer and seller, where everyone's vital interests were protected. The evolution
of CPM guarantees is a good example of how the system worked.
Guarantees meant risk-free buying
The first guaranteed CPM was negotiated by American Home Products with ABC
in 1967. It was an informal commitment by the number three network to protect
a buyer who bought early. The other networks soon learned buyers would pay a
premium for a guaranteed buy and wouldn't be as picky about the programs.
The timing was perfect.
Despite the celebrity of the Nielsen "Top 10," the TV networks were
no longer selling shows; they were selling CPM's. To get the hits at a reasonable
price, you had to take the rest and you had to buy it all upfront. If you did
that, the networks would guarantee audience delivery.
Guarantees revolutionized the business. The move from sponsorship in the 1960's
had reduced advertiser risk. The CPM guarantees of the 1970's and 1980's eliminated
it entirely. By 1985, guaranteed upfront buys accounted for 85 percent of prime
time sales and the words "feeding frenzy" began appearing in print
to describe the rush to buy early. Then came the crash.
Advertisers challenge the upfront
By 1986, network ratings
were falling, so ABC, CBS and NBC began quietly increasing commercial time.
By 1989, FOX had expanded its programming and both cable and syndication were
supplying more inventory, all at a time when a weakening economy was reducing
demand. For the first time in a long time, there was more TV time available
than advertisers willing to buy it.
By 1990, the weak TV market led advertisers to question the need for an upfront.
In February 1992, at the ANA Television Advertising Forum, Procter & Gamble
(Jim Van Cleave), Y&R (Paul Isaacson) and J. Walter Thompson (Jerry Dominus,
who had just moved from being head of sales at CBS) argued for abandoning the
upfront in favor of a continuous TV market.
But a reviving economy came to the rescue. In August 1992, $3.8 billion was
spent in the prime time upfront, considerably more than the year earlier and
CPM's were up for the first time in three years. In 1994, the prime time upfront
hit a record $4.5 billion. This year with far less inventory, it was close to
$8 billion.
Get you now or get you later?
The networks claim they don't need the upfront to sell. They say "we'll
get you now or get you later." That may be disinformation. A Spring upfront
for the following year's budget is a preemptive selling strategy that all media
envy.
But now there are other big players looking to help set the price of television,
the mega-media agencies. Today close to 40% of TV dollars are concentrated at
four big buyers. The question is whether they can use their market power to
restrain prices the way the big four networks have used theirs to increase them.
It's unlikely because of the difference in objectives. Sellers want the highest
price. Buyers will settle for buying better than the market. This leads them
to commit dollars for the guarantee of a lower than average percent increase
- the so-called "Concept deal." Buying for competitive advantage without
a keen regard to absolute price invites the networks charge more.
It’s alive!
This past season, with
the economy in recession, TV ratings down and advertisers cutting back on everything,
a weak upfront was expected. Yet broadcast network prime time TV prices were
still up 8%-to-15%. There were many explanations offered, none of them convincing.
And that is the most frightening thing about this monster called the upfront.
It’s Frankenstein-like ability to come back from the dead.
- April 1, 2003 -
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